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Executive Summary 
 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) together with the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development - Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) and the 
European Commission's Joint Research Centre - Institute for Energy, have been organizing 
several Technical Meetings regarding the use of Modern Safety Methods for the Licensing of 
Nuclear Power plants. 
This document presents the main results of the Technical Meeting on "Application of 
Advanced Safety Methods" held on 7-11 June 2010 in Bled, Slovenia. This meeting was the 
fourth of a specific technical meeting series dedicated to these methods. The previous 
Technical Meetings on the same topic were: 
 
• "Use of Best Estimate Approach in Licensing with Evaluation of Uncertainties", Pisa, 
12-16 September 2005, Pisa, Italy 
• "Use of Safety Margins and Advanced Safety Analyses Methods for Plant 
Modifications", 14 -19 September 2008, Budapest, Hungary, 
• Application of Deterministic Best Estimate Safety Analyses”, 21-25 September 2009, 
Pisa, Italy 
 
The main objective of these Technical Meetings is to provide a forum to exchange results and 
present issues associated with the use of Advanced Safety Methods. More specifically focus is 
set on Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) using Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) 
methods and on Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). 
All domains are covered (research, benchmarking, licensing) as the main goal is to provide 
advances in each.  
 
With respect to the conservative methods of the 80's and 90's, the use of BEPU methods is 
possible today due to the increase in knowledge in Thermal-hydraulic phenomena. This is due 
to the extensive international experimental campaigns in Separate Effect and in Integral Test 
Facilities followed by a huge verification and validation effort done by the code developers 
and the independent users. 
The use of these tools is also possible due to the availability of economical high performance 
computational tools. The two factors have allowed a much clearer understanding of the 
phenomena and a better estimation of the available safety margin during Design Base 
Accidents.  
 
Industry today is moving rapidly in this direction in order to be able to demonstrate 
compliance to safety limits after power uprates as the older conservative methods were shown 
to be too pessimistic and limiting. Generally, due to the large effort in having a BEPU 
methodology accepted by the national nuclear licensing authority and in performing these 
calculations, this methodology is used only for the most limiting accident (generally a Large 
Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)). Currently a pioneering effort is ongoing for fully 
licensing of the Argentinean reactor Atucha-2 with a BEPU method. 
 
The use of probabilistic and deterministic methods is starting to be used for defence in depth 
concept and also more often in combination with Deterministic Safety Analysis. 
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All levels of defence such as Control of abnormal plant conditions, Control of Deign Basis 
Accidents, Accident management (including PSA level 2), and Offsite emergency 
management can be addressed 
 
The Integration of Probabilistic Safety Assessments and Deterministic Safety Analysis can 
also be used for improvement of the human reliability analysis. Best Estimate safety analyses 
can be used for a precise PSA modelling. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) together with the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development - Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) and the 
European Commission's Joint Research Centre - Institute for Energy have been organizing 
several Technical Meetings regarding the use of Advanced Safety Methods for the Licensing 
of Nuclear Power plants. 
This document presents the main results of the Technical Meeting on Application of 
Advanced Safety Methods held on 7-11 June 2010 in Bled, Slovenia. This meeting was the 
fourth of a specific technical meeting series dedicated to these methods. The previous 
Technical Meeting on the same topic were: 
 
• "Use of Best Estimate Approach in Licensing with Evaluation of Uncertainties", Pisa, 
12-16 September 2005, Pisa, Italy 
• "Use of Safety Margins and Advanced Safety Analyses Methods for Plant 
Modifications", 14 -19 September 2008, Budapest, Hungary, 
• Application of Deterministic Best Estimate Safety Analyses”, 21-25 September 2009, 
Pisa, Italy 
 
The participants, after 3 days of presentations were requested to draft a document 
summarizing the main finding. A. Bucalossi and G. Vayssier were responsible for the 
Deterministic and Probabilistic parts, respectively. The following chapters are the summary of 
the Technical Meeting findings. 
The Deterministic Safety Analysis section is based on the structure of IAEA Specific Safety 
Guide 2 (SSG-2) [1]: "Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants" whereas the 
Probabilistic section is based on specific findings during the meeting. 
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2. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis 
2.1. Areas of Application  
Deterministic Safety Analyses (DSA) should be carried out for the following areas: 
 
Design of nuclear power plants  
Either a conservative approach or a best estimate methodology combined with accounting for 
uncertainties in prediction of margin parameters could be used to confirm that the design 
meets its intent. 
 
Safety Analysis Reports  
A Safety Analysis Report is required as part of licensing a new reactor design, obtaining 
regulatory approval for plant design or operational modifications, and finally as part of the 
periodic safety review.  Either a conservative approach or a best estimate methodology 
combined with accounting for uncertainties in prediction of margin parameters could be used 
to perform the analysis. 
 
Regulatory Assessment of the Analysis in the Safety Reports 
The regulator, as part of the licensing review of the analysis in the Safety Reports, could 
perform their own analysis in order to confirm validity of the conclusions reported in the 
safety reports.  Either a conservative approach or a best estimate methodology combined with 
accounting for uncertainties in prediction of margin parameter could be used towards this 
assessment. 
 
Design or Operational Modifications 
As part of ongoing improvements in a Nuclear Power Plant, including periodic 
refurbishments, safety analysis may be performed to assess the extent of the proposed 
modifications and their subsequent benefit. Either a conservative approach or a best estimate 
methodology combined with accounting for uncertainties in prediction of margin parameters 
could be used to perform the analysis 
 
Root Cause Analysis and preparation of Abnormal Operation Procedures (AOP) 
A best estimate methodology could be used to prepare Abnormal Operation Procedures or to 
perform root cause analysis of incidents which have already occurred in a Nuclear Power 
Plant. To better understand the behaviour of the Nuclear Power Plant, analysis of such 
incidents could include hypothetical failure of some components or systems. 
 
The development and maintenance of emergency operating procedures and accident 
management procedures. 
Best estimate codes together with realistic assumptions should be used in these cases. 
Severe Accident Management: A best estimate methodology could be used to perform Severe 
Accident Management Guidalines (SAMG) analysis. To better understand the behaviour of 
the Nuclear Power Plant, analysis of such incidents could include hypothetical failure of some 
components or systems. 
 
Periodic Safety Review  
The refinement of previous safety analyses in the context of a periodic safety review to 
provide assurance that the original assessments and conclusions are still valid. 
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Safety Analysis should be performed using validated computational toolsets. During the 
licensing period, the computer codes should be maintained in a frozen state in order to ensure 
consistency and audit-ability of the safety analysis reported in the safety reports, although 
minor changes that do not impact the qualification of the code can be acceptable.  Better 
understanding of the underlying phenomena as a result of the on-going research and 
development activities could be incorporated in these codes in form of new models.  
However, unless these findings have an adverse impact on the conclusions in the Safety 
reports, a revision to the analysis would have to wait until the next licensing period. 
2.2. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis to the Design of 
Nuclear Power Plants 
The Design Basis (DB) for Systems, Components and Structures (SSC) which are important 
to safety is required to be established and confirmed by means of a comprehensive safety 
assessment.  The design basis includes design requirements that must be met to ensure safe 
operation of a nuclear power plant.  Deterministic safety analysis, either in form of a 
conservative approach or a best estimate methodology combined with accounting for 
uncertainties in prediction of margin parameters, is used to confirm that the design meets its 
intent.  Applicability of the analytical assumptions, methods and degree of conservatism used 
in the safety analysis must be verifiable. 
2.3. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis to the Licensing of 
Nuclear Power Plants  
Compliance with all applicable regulations and standards and other relevant safety 
requirements is essential for the safe and reliable operation of a nuclear power plant. This 
should be demonstrated by means of an initial or an updated safety analysis report. 
The safety analysis of the plant design must be consistent with the current or ‘as built’ state. 
The safety analysis examines: 
 
• All planned modes of the plant in normal operation; 
• Plant performance in anticipated operational occurrences; 
• Design basis accidents; 
• Event sequences that may lead to beyond design basis accidents. 
 
On the basis of this analysis, the robustness of the engineering design to perform its safety 
functions during postulated initiating events and accidents should be established. In addition, 
the effectiveness of the safety systems and safety related systems should be demonstrated, and 
guidance for emergency response should be provided. 
 
Analyses should be performed for transients that can occur in all planned modes of the plant 
in normal operation, including operations during shutdown. This plant state was sometimes 
neglected in early safety analyses. For this mode of operation, the contributors to risk include: 
the inability to start some safety systems automatically; equipment in maintenance or in 
repair; reduced amounts of coolant in the primary circuit as well as the secondary circuit for 
some modes; instrumentation switched off or non-functional and measurements not made; 
open primary circuit; and open containment. Where appropriate, the specific features of a best 
estimate analysis of shutdown transients should include thermal stratification of coolant in the 
reactor pressure vessel, low power, low inventory conditions, the presence of non-
condensable gases and long term evolution of a transient. Every configuration of shutdown 
modes should be analysed. The main objectives of the analysis are to evaluate the ability of 
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plant systems to perform safety functions and to determine the time available for the operators 
to establish safety functions. These safety functions include controlling the reactivity of the 
fuel, maintaining the ability to remove heat from the fuel, confinement of radioactive 
materials. The range of scenarios should be evaluated to determine whether abrupt changes in 
the results of the analysis occur for a realistic variation of inputs (usually termed bifurcation 
or cliff edge effects).  
 
Use of Deterministic Analysis for the Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) implies the 
use of qualified tools, tool’s users and methodologies. Such qualification process should be 
fixed and detailed by the corresponding nuclear safety regulator, taking into account, as much 
as possible, the best practices at the international levels. For keeping the qualification level at 
a state-of-the-art, the active participation of the technical support organizations of the nuclear 
regulatory body to international computational benchmarks, experimental campaigns and 
methodologies assessment projects should be recommended. 
 
Therefore, Final Safety Analyses Report should be submitted with a series of supporting 
documents in which a proof of the conducted validation campaign is demonstrated. Proper use 
of best-estimate codes should be encouraged for the licensing analyses. Analysis by the three 
dimensional neutron kinetics coupled thermal-hydraulic codes should also be recommended 
where accident progression results in asymmetric distribution of power, thermalhydraulic 
properties or poison load. Investigation of the effects of the power shape changes during the 
transients on the peak cladding temperature should be performed and used for a better 
understanding of the available safety margin. Beneficial actions from the control system 
should not be considered during this kind of calculations. 
 
Uncertainties sources and their quantifications should be carefully evaluated. A clear 
distinction between which are the code uncertainties and the input uncertainties should always 
be provided in the documentation. Effects of different software operating systems on the 
results should also be checked and clearly documented. 
2.4. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis to the Assessment of 
Safety Analysis Reports  
The operating organization must ensure that an independent verification of the safety 
assessment is performed by individuals or groups separate from those carrying out the design, 
before the design is submitted to the regulatory body. Additional independent analyses of 
selected aspects may also be carried out by or on behalf of the regulatory body. The use of 
multiple fully independent computational tools and methodologies by these independent 
individuals or groups should be pursued. Advanced best-estimate computational techniques 
should be used only when both the code and user are qualified. 
2.5. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis in Plant 
Modifications  
A nuclear power plant may be modified on the basis of feedback from operational experience, 
the findings of periodic safety reviews, regulatory requirements, advances in knowledge or 
developments in technology. To comply with the requirements, a revision of the safety 
analysis of the plant design should be made when major modifications or modernization 
programmes are implemented, when advances in technical knowledge and understanding of 
physical phenomena are made, when changes in the described plant configuration are 
implemented or when changes are made in operating procedures owing to operational 
experience. 
 9 of 37 
 
The modification of existing nuclear power plants is normally undertaken to counteract the 
ageing of the plant, to justify the continued operation of the plant, to take advantage of 
developments in technology or to comply with changes to the applicable rules and 
regulations. More specifically a nuclear safety related modification refers to a permanent or 
temporary alteration from the original design of structures, systems, components, operations, 
processes, operating and emergency procedures, operating limits and conditions, technical 
specifications that could influence nuclear safety.  The following, for example, are excluded 
from the definition: 
 
• Replacement of a component with a new one that is exactly the same. 
• Normal maintenance 
• Operational changes within the existing safety justification, without changing the 
operating procedures or other safety documentation. 
 
Other important applications of deterministic safety analysis are aimed at the more 
economical utilization of the reactor and the nuclear fuel. Most of the major modifications 
performed in the industry deal with power up rates, Steam Generator Replacement (even 
without power uprating but due to technological aging), new type of fuel and replacement of 
major systems (e.g. Instrumentation & Control). Such applications often imply that the safety 
margins to operating limits are reduced and special care should be taken to ensure that the 
limits are not exceeded. 
 
All the effects of plant changes should be considered and the analysis should cover all 
possible aspects of the plant changes. In addition, it should be demonstrated that the 
cumulative effects of changes are acceptable. 
 
Deterministic safety analyses should be used both for safety improvements and to support 
modifications to improve the economy of the plant. In all cases, the safe operation of the plant 
in accordance with the assumptions and intent of the design should be verified and this should 
be the main focus of the deterministic safety analyses. 
 
The impact of major plant modifications on Operating Limits and Conditions (OLC) and on 
Operating Instructions and Procedure (OIP) will differ from depending on the exact plant 
modification performed. Experience showed that in most cases the safety margins and set-
points of the plant have been modified (e.g. former constant linear power limit replaced by 
one decreasing with burn-up; the set-points of: average temperature, the water level in the 
pressurizer, the pressure in the steam generators, the water level in the steam generators, etc) 
but on the contrary only minor changes to the OIP occurred. 
2.6. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis to the Analysis of 
Operational Events  
Accident analyses may be used as a tool for obtaining a full understanding of events that 
occur during the operation of nuclear power plants, and should form an integral part of the 
feedback from operational experience. Operational events may be analysed with the following 
objectives: 
 
• As an aid to the traditional root-cause methodologies to the analysis of an Operational 
event 
• To check the adequacy of the selection of postulated initiating events;  
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• To determine whether the transients that have been analysed in the safety analysis 
report bound the event; 
• To provide additional information on the time dependence of the values of parameters 
that are not directly observable using the plant instrumentation; 
• To check whether the plant operators and plant systems performed as intended and 
evaluate the impact of operator interaction and automatic procedures; 
• To check and review emergency operating procedures; 
• To have a better understanding and identify any new safety issues and questions 
arising from the analyses; 
• To support the resolution of potential safety issues that are identified in the analysis of 
an event; 
• To analyse the severity of possible consequences in the event of additional failures 
(such as severe accident precursors); 
• To validate and adjust the models in the computer codes that are used for analyses and 
in training simulators. 
 
The analysis of operational events requires the use of a best estimate approach. Actual plant 
data should be used.  
 
Since very often plant measurement recordings are not sufficient for the operational event 
analyses sensitivity studies, should be performed to acquire confidence with the predictions. 
The evaluation of safety significant events is a very important aspect of the feedback of 
operational experience. Modern best estimate computer codes make it possible to investigate 
and to gain a detailed understanding of plant behaviour. Conclusions from such analyses 
should be incorporated into the plant procedures that address the use of feedback from 
operational experience. 
 
Most of the large number of operational events that have occurred in nuclear power plants 
have been analyzed qualitatively to establish root causes but only a few were investigated by 
using deterministic computer codes. Only when the phenomena were not understood and the 
root cause was not identified or the safety margin was challenged the need for a deterministic 
safety analysis was required. Typical events that fall into this category are:  
 
• Malfunction of valves, pumps or other components, resulting in a complex transient  
response 
• Inadequate/unexpected response of a control or safety system 
• Pipeline leakage, rupture or thermal fatigue 
• Reactivity events 
 
The deterministic safety analysis may be performed either on a dedicated training simulator 
(plant analyzers) or on a dedicated specific input deck depending on the complexity of the 
transient. 
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2.7. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis to the Development 
and Validation of Emergency Operating Procedures 
Best estimate deterministic safety analyses should be performed to confirm the strategies that 
have been developed to restore normal operational conditions at the plant following transients 
due to anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents. These strategies are 
reflected in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) that define the actions that should 
be taken during such events. Deterministic safety analyses are required to provide the input 
that is necessary to specify the operator actions to be taken in response to some accidents, and 
the analyses should be an important element in the review of accident management strategies. 
In the development of the recovery strategies, to establish the available time period for the 
operator to take effective action, sensitivity calculations should be carried out on the timing of 
the necessary operator actions, and these calculations may be used to optimize the procedures. 
 
After the EOPs have been developed, a validation analysis should be performed. This analysis 
is usually performed by using a qualified simulator. The validation should confirm that a 
trained operator can perform the specified actions within the time period allowed and that the 
reactor will reach a safe end state. Possible failures of plant systems and possible errors by the 
operator should be considered in the sensitivity analyses. 
 
When the predictions of a computer code that has been used to support or to verify a EOPs do 
not agree with observed plant behaviour during an event, the code and the procedure should 
be reviewed. Any changes that are made to the emergency operating procedure should be 
consistent with the observed plant behaviour.  
 
EOPs provide predefined and prioritized event and symptom based response procedures that 
give guidance to the operator in management of accidents, and diagnosis to guide plant 
recovery to the optimal end state. Accident analysis is an important step in the EOP 
development because computer simulation is the most comprehensive way of knowing the 
response of the plant in various transient conditions to the recovery strategies. Best estimate 
deterministic safety analysis can provide general trends of plant parameters, available 
symptoms, states, timing of actions, and as such play a role in strategy development as well as 
verification of some safety criteria. The deterministic safety analysis can be applied to 
analytical support tasks in development of EOPs such as: identification of plant 
vulnerabilities, success criteria1, time and means available to operator for the success of the 
applied measures and specifics of plant behaviour. Determining and validation of strategies, 
or selecting the strategy among different possibilities for the individual EOPs could involve a 
large number of best estimate analyses.  
 
Defining the time window in which one action is successful is very important for defining and 
validation of the procedure. Uncertainty of one event could play a large role in the overall 
plant recovery. This estimate is usually based on the sensitivity studies, also the definition of 
the strategies and set-point values. The various uncertainty methodologies can be 
implemented for determining strategies and set-point values, and also the operator actions in 
order to give the minimum time window for operator actions which will ensure successful 
completion of the recovery procedure. 
 
                                                 
1
  i.e. what equipment is needed to remain inside acceptance criteria – this can be different from the 
equipment analysed by conservative codes. In addition, EOPs may cover events which are beyond the plant 
licensed design basis. 
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Importance of using best estimate deterministic analysis in development and validation of 
EOPs lies in addition in analysis of Pressurized Thermal Shock transients (PTS), transients 
with high pressure in reactor coolant system and interaction of cold safety injection water and 
hot vessel wall. Operator actions undertaken to mitigate consequences of the accidents should 
not increase the probability of the reactor pressure vessel failure. Integrity of the RPV must be 
preserved throughout the plant operation during all operational states and accident conditions. 
In order to address this issue and to provide bounding analysis for the development of the 
EOPs deterministic best estimate analysis should be applied for the screening of the most 
severe PTS scenarios caused by operator’s actions. PTS screening methodology based on the 
application of the determined PTS criteria on the results of the deterministic analysis will 
screen out the most severe PTS transients for which, in development of EOPs, special care has 
to be provided in order to avoid increasing of the probability that the operator’s actions, which 
they are instructed to perform in order to mitigate accidents, could adversely affect integrity 
of the reactor pressure vessel.  
2.8. Application of Deterministic Safety Analysis to the Development 
of Guidelines for the Management of Severe Accidents  
Deterministic safety analyses should also be performed to assist the development of the 
strategy that an operator should follow if the emergency operating procedures fail to prevent a 
severe accident from occurring. The analyses should be carried out by using one or more of 
the specialized computer codes that are available to model relevant physical phenomena. 
Physical phenomena in case of severe accidents are strongly interdependent, e.g. thermal 
hydraulics, chemical interactions, material liquefaction during the flooding of hot damaged 
cores. 
 
For light water reactors, these include thermohydraulic effects, heating and melting of the 
reactor core, the retention of the molten core in the lower plenum, molten-core–concrete 
interactions, steam explosions, hydrogen generation and combustion, fission product 
behaviour and containment direct heating to confirm the risk of containment failure if in-
vessel retention is not available. 
 
The analyses should be performed using a number of validated best estimate computer codes 
as, usually, no single code can represent all the concerned phenomena.  During the analysis 
unique features of the plant should be taken into account. The analyses should be used to 
identify what challenges to fission product boundaries can be expected during progression of 
accidents and which phenomena will occur. These should be used to provide the basis for 
developing strategies, followed by the development of a set of guidelines for managing 
accidents and mitigating their consequences.  
 
In the analyses uncertainties in timing and magnitude of phenomena should be considered. 
The analysis should start with the selection of the accident sequences which, without 
intervention by the operator, would lead to core damage. 
 
All core damage sequences identified in the PSA, if available, should be considered and also 
operator errors, which can lead to severe accident conditions should be analysed. 
 
A grouping of accident sequences with similar characteristics should be used to limit the 
number of sequences that need to be analysed. Such a categorization may be based on several 
indicators of the state of the plant: the postulated initiating event, shutdown status, the status 
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of the emergency core cooling systems, the coolant pressure boundary, the secondary heat 
sink, the system for the removal of containment heat and the containment boundary. 
 
The measures can be broadly divided into preventive measures and mitigatory actions. Both 
categories should be subject to analysis. 
 
Preventive measures are recovery strategies to prevent core or fuel damage. They should be 
analysed to investigate what actions are possible to inhibit or delay the onset of core damage. 
Examples of such actions are: various manual restorations of systems; primary and secondary 
feed and bleed; depressurization of the primary or secondary system; and restarting of the 
reactor coolant pumps. Conditions for the initiation of the actions should be specified, as well 
as criteria for when to throttle or stop the actions, or to change to another action. 
 
Mitigatory measures are strategies for managing severe accidents to mitigate the 
consequences of core melt. Such strategies include: coolant injection to the degraded core; 
depressurization of the primary circuit; operation of containment sprays; and the use of the 
fan coolers, hydrogen recombiners and filtered containment venting. Such measures are 
available in reactors of different types that are in operation or being constructed. Possible 
adverse effects that may occur as a consequence of taking mitigatory measures should be 
taken into account, such as pressure spikes, hydrogen generation, return to criticality, steam 
explosions, thermal shock or hydrogen deflagration or detonation. 
2.9. Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) 
New deterministic analyses may be required to refine previous safety analyses in the context 
of a periodic safety review to provide assurance that the original assessments and conclusions 
are still valid or, otherwise, initiate corrective actions.  In such analyses, account should be 
taken of any margins that may have become reduced and may continue to be reduced owing 
to ageing over the period under consideration or to newer safety insights, changes in 
regulations, or to other processes that may influence previously defined or understood safety 
margins. 
 
Usually, there is no reduction of calculated margin in deterministic analysis used as licensing 
bases (currently conservative approach in respect to parameters and equipment availability – 
option 1 and 2) because via appropriate maintenance, surveillance and configuration 
management (which are obviously subject of PSR activities) the real parameters and 
equipment status are kept sufficiently distant from limiting values incorporated in licensing 
analysis. Certain margin exists between SSC’s status and parameters used in safety analysis 
(which is changing by ageing etc.). It is ensured that existing margin between calculated 
results by safety analysis and the criteria remains the same. Best estimate analyses together 
with an evaluation of the uncertainties may be appropriate to demonstrate that the remaining 
margins are adequate. 
 
The objective of a PSR is to determine by means of a comprehensive assessment of an 
existing nuclear power plant:  
 
• the extent to which the plant conforms to current international safety standards and 
practices;  
• the extent to which the licensing basis remains valid;  
• the adequacy of the arrangements that are in place to maintain plant safety until the 
next PSR or the end of plant lifetime;  
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• and the safety improvements to be implemented to resolve the safety issues that have 
been identified (NS-G-2.10 [2] par. 2.8). 
 
The PSR is a full scope comprehensive safety assessment method, which covers all safety 
important aspects of nuclear power plant. According to NS-G-2.10 the hereinafter areas of 
review should b considered: (1) Plant design, (2) Actual condition of SSCs, (3) Equipment 
qualification, (4) Ageing, (5) Deterministic safety analysis, (6) Probabilistic safety analysis, 
(7) Hazard analysis, (8) Safety performance, (9) Use of experience from other plants and 
research findings, (10) Organization and administration, (11) Procedures, (12) The human 
factor, (13) Emergency planning. (14) Radiological impact on the environment (NS-G-2.10 
par. 2.8). 
 
Because the typical frequency of a periodic safety review is 10 years, a possibility exists of 
significant increase of knowledge, standards and technologies. Effects of ageing, cumulative 
effects of modifications (technical and organizational) etc. could become significant. Taking 
into account all these changes, the task of PSR is to provide assurance that measures either 
already present at the plant or adopted as a corrective measure will ensure safe operation for 
the period of time until the next PSR. 
2.9.1. Deterministic safety analysis – PSR review area 5 (in NS-G-2.10, para 
4.1) 
The objective of the deterministic safety analysis review is to determine to what extent the 
existing deterministic safety analysis remains valid when the following aspects have been 
taken into account:  
• actual plant design;  
• the actual condition of SSCs and their predicted state at the end of the period covered 
by the PSR;  
• current deterministic methods; and 
• current safety standards and knowledge.  
 
In addition, the review should also identify any weaknesses relating to the application of the 
defence in depth concept (NS-G-2.10 par. 4.26). 
The deterministic analysis in this PSR review area can be used in these cases: 
• update of analysis performed by outdated computational tools 
• evaluating new Postulated Initiating Events (PIE) based on plant’s own e.g. PSA 
studies (PSR review area No. 6), new legislative requirements or hazard analysis (PSR 
review area No. 7) 
• new approaches and presumptions based on latest research and development could be 
required by the regulatory authorities 
• PSR usage as a source of input for Long Term Operation (LTO), BEPU methods could 
be advantage for assurance that safety margins will remain acceptable. 
2.9.2. Other PSR review areas 
Usage of deterministic analysis in a framework of PSR is not bound to deterministic safety 
analysis area only. It can be used in: 
 
Area 1 – plant design. 
Example could be the situation when Design Bases information is not fully available at plant. 
In certain situation the necessary Design Bases information (parameters) could be 
reconstituted using deterministic analysis. The Design Bases information is not only 
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necessary for safe configuration management, but the PSR itself uses Design Bases 
information e.g. to confirm adequacy of current (and predicted) status of SSC’s. 
 
Area 11 – procedures 
Sometimes the procedures (e.g. Abnormal Operating Procedures) could be derived mainly on 
engineering judgement. During the PSR the deterministic analysis using best estimate 
techniques may be required to confirm adequacy of these procedures. Development of 
Emergency Operating Procedures and SAMG’s is another typical application of best estimate 
deterministic analysis connected to PSR area 11. 
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3. Application Of Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
3.1. General observations of PSA applications 
 
• For all Defence-in-Depth (DiD) levels the PSA should be a living PSA. Human 
reliability aspects are part of the training for operation including maintenance to obtain 
a low failure rate of equipment. 
• Cost-benefit analyses are one of PSA applications. Apart from dose, social economic 
effects and environmental consequences might also be considered, as large releases 
may have detrimental effects on the functioning of the society and on the environment. 
• Not using PSA is not beneficial for safety. 
• PSA should only be used with an estimate of the uncertainties in the results. 
• PSA should be executed on the base of internationally accepted standards. 
3.2. Application of PSA into various levels of the did concept 
INSAG 10 [3] defines the concept of Defence in Depth as follows: 
 
The concept of defence in depth, which concerns the protection of both the public and 
workers, is fundamental to the safety of nuclear installations. As was stated the Basic Safety 
Principles for Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG-3) in relation to the safety of nuclear power 
plants, "All safety activities, whether organizational, behavioural or equipment related, are 
subject to layers of overlapping provisions, so that if a failure should occur it would be 
compensated for or corrected without causing harm to individuals or the public at large. This 
idea of multiple levels of protection is the central feature of defence in depth..."  
 
Further description of Defence in Depth is provided by NS-R-1 [4] and NS-G-1.2 [5]. 
3.2.1. Defence in Depth Level 1 – Avoidance of abnormal plant state by good 
design 
• Risk Informed Operational Limits and Conditions (OLC, often called Technical 
Specifications)  
- allowed outage time including plant outage (e.g. CANDU) 
- selection of mandatory2 plant modes after exceeding limiting conditions for 
operations (LCO) 
• Online maintenance and inspection 
• Shutdown planning 
• Risk Monitor as a support to plant state modifications3 and to support online 
maintenance and inspection and shutdown planning – support also for the national 
regulatory authority (NRA), possibly online available 
• Design reliability in normal operating systems to avoid intervention of protective 
systems 
• PSA for proper electric grid connection:  no loss of electric grid upon turbine trip or 
load rejection4 
                                                 
2
  Often, exceeding OLC mandates cold shutdown. Risk analysis may show that e.g. hot standby is also 
an acceptable mode, which avoids taking the plant through the large transient that the cold shutdown is. 
3
  An example of an industrial tool is the EOOS risk monitor (Equipment Out Of Service) by EPRI 
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• Effects and control of ageing 
3.2.2. Defence in Depth Level 2 – Control of abnormal plant conditions 
• PSA can be used to obtain a high reliability of the control systems 
• PSA can be used to optimize control action set points (plant conditions5 II, AOO) 
3.2.3. Defence in Depth Level 3 – Control of design Basis Accidents (includes 
Plant Conditions III and IV, AOOs and DBAs) 
• PSA can be used to obtain a high reliability of the safety systems (e.g. degree of 
redundancy and diversity, role of spatial separation of trains and sub-trains) including 
finding weak points in safety systems design, such as common cause failures 
(traditional weak points) 
• PSA can be used to optimize safety system set points (plant conditions III and IV, 
DBA), using for instance sensitivity analysis 
• PSA may be used to identify systems and parts of systems relevant to safety, although 
they are not classified as safety systems. This includes auxiliary systems (e.g., for 
keeping lines full, for lubrication, for pneumatic air, etc.6) 
• PSA can be used for the optimization of EOPs, up to and including DBA7s, including 
human reliability aspects 
• PSA can find the vulnerability of low pressure parts of supportive systems potentially 
subjected to high RCS pressure (by improper isolation between the high pressure and 
low pressure parts) 
• PSA can be used to optimize the separation between SBLOCA and LBLOCA 
 
3.2.4. DiD level 4 – Accident management (includes PSA level 2) 
• PSA gives safety relevance of systems for prevention of core melt in BDBA (e.g. 
ATWS, SBO, Total Loss of Heat Sink) 
• Optimization of EOPs (for BDBA not being core melts) 
• PSA gives the scenarios that challenge fission product boundaries, i.e. plant 
vulnerabilities for severe accidents. Examples of such challenges are hydrogen 
combustion, containment pressurization, basemat melt trough, interfacing LOCA. 
• PSA gives the plant capabilities to mitigate severe accidents (e.g., impact of igniters, 
containment vent, flooding of RPV cavity). 
• PSA is an appropriate tool for developing the SAMGs in that it provides the 
chronology of the fission products boundary challenges and, hence, the nature and the 
priority of the potential counter measures 
• PSA provides scenarios to train the operators for emergencies and execution of 
SAMG; here care should be exercised that the scenarios selected will lead to execution 
of an appropriate number of guidelines 
• PSA is also a tool to investigate the reliability of mitigation actions (e.g. in the AP 
1000 the connection from the RWST to the reactor cavity). This includes 
consequences of and potential counter measures against spurious actuation of the 
mitigative actions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
  For added reliability, connecting lines to diesels may be suspended 
5
 This terminology has been superseeded, but is still frequently in use. 
6
  Further information e.g. in ANS 58.14 
7
  For beyond DBA, see DiD level 4 
 18 of 37 
Caution: PSA-predicted plant performance may not always be what the plant operators will 
see and therefore, the plant operator may induce wrong actions if he deduces his actions from 
such plant predictions (e.g. actual containment pressure at RPV melt-through may be smaller 
than predicted - due to the lack of heavy thermo-hydraulic shock - and the operator may 
assume that the core is still in the vessel). PSA may have bifurcations that we may not see in 
an actual transient. 
3.2.5. DiD level 5 – Offsite emergency management 
• PSA provide scenarios for offsite emergency management drills 
• PSA provide estimates of potential releases during real events (this pre-supposes a 
certain insight in ongoing accidents8). 
• PSA can be used for regulation based on release limits (requires PSA-2 level) 
• PSA can be used for regulation based on doses (requires PSA-3 level) 
3.3. Limitations and improper use of PSA 
• Safety systems should not be candidates for being deleted from the design basis due to 
the calculated low safety benefit9 
• PSA should not be used to fill up the margins to available safety criteria 
• PSA is and remains an assessment tool, and is not a design tool 
• PSA should not be used to decrease sound conservative design margins.  
• A PSA scenario is a sketch of the reality – it will never represent a real event 
• PSA, like any other assessment tool, has inherent limitations:  it can not fully take into 
consideration the human behaviour, e.g. the quality of different manufacturers for the 
same piece of equipment, etc. 
                                                 
8
  A program capable of providing a capability for timely estimate of the likely release of radioactivity 
to the environment from possible nuclear accidents is STERPS. See also the program SPRINT (e.g. at 
www.enconet.com). 
9
  An example is a vendor who removed the originally present double-wall containment from the 
design, because he  found through PSA that he was able to stay inside regulatory criteria with a single-wall 
containment 
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4. Conclusions 
The main objective of these Technical Meetings was to provide a forum to exchange results 
and present issues associated to the use of Advanced Safety Methods. More specifically focus 
was set on Deterministic Safety Analysis using Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) 
methods and on Probabilistic Safety Analysis. All domains were covered (research, 
benchmarking, licensing) as the main goal was to provide advances in each.  
 
Industry today is moving rapidly in this direction in order to be able to demonstrate 
compliance to safety limits after power uprates as the older conservative methods were shown 
to be too pessimistic. Generally, due to the large effort in having a BEPU methodology 
accepted by the national nuclear licensing authority and in performing these calculations, this 
methodology is used for the most limiting accident (generally a Large Break LOCA). 
Currently a pioneering effort is ongoing for fully licensing of the Argentinean reactor Atucha-
2 with a BEPU method. 
 
The use of probabilistic and deterministic methods is starting to be used for defence in depth 
concept and also more often in combination with Deterministic Safety Analysis. All levels of 
defence such as Control of abnormal plant conditions, Control of Design Basis Accidents, 
Accident management (including PSA level 2), and Offsite emergency management can be 
addressed. 
 
The Integration of Probabilistic Safety Assessments and Deterministic Safety Analysis can 
also be used for improvement of the human reliability analysis. Best Estimate safety analyses 
can be used for a precise PSA modelling. 
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APPENDIX 1:  NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF PSA 
 
A1.1 India 
 
The safety analysis of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is carried out using both deterministic 
and probabilistic methods. The probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) level – 1 has been carried 
out for NPPs at full power operation with internal initiating events. Level-2 PSA at full power 
operation has been carried out for one NPP. Level – 3 PSA has not been done.  The low 
power and shutdown PSA has not been done. 
 
The initiating events (IEs) are classified as LOCA IE and transient IE. The system reliabilities 
are evaluated using fault tree approach. For initiating event frequencies both generic values 
and plant specific values have been used. The component failure data from plant and generic 
data has been used and also Bayesian updating carried out. Common cause failure (CCF) 
analysis has been carried out for pumps, valves etc. The uncertainty analysis is performed for 
the PSA level-1. Human errors in execution of tasks (pre initiators and post initiators) are 
considered in the fault trees using human reliability analysis (HRA). 
 
The risk measure in terms of core damage frequency (CDF) is calculated from the IE event 
trees. These are compared against IAEA recommended value. 
 
A1.2 Republic of Korea 
 
Primary purposes of PSA implementation in Korea are to identify the risk level and to show 
that a plant operates under the safety goal (10E-4/yr CDF) (which is not a legal requirement 
currently, but there is no plant to violate the safety goal).  
 
For the identification of risk level of all plants, Korean nuclear regulation authority (KINS, 
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety) had pushed the licensee to implement Level 1 and Level 2 
PSA for all licensed plants from the middle of 1990s. PSA reports for operating plants had 
been submitted to the regulation authority individually without regulation requirements (legal 
enforcement) and they have been being periodically updated for reliability data and model. 
However, for new plants under licensing process including the licensing renewal plants, 
licensee should submit PSA report as a part of Safety Analysis Report (SAR) to approve the 
operating license.  
 
Principal frameworks for the regulation in Korea are based on the deterministic approaches, 
so probabilistic approaches such as risk-informed applications have been approved case by 
case. A few of applications have been done and other cases are processing now. For 
examples, the extension of surveillance test interval (STI) of Plant Protection System (Reactor 
Protection System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems) has been approved for 
some plants, but for the other plants it has been partially approved and remaining parts are 
processing now; Extension of the test interval for Integrated Leak Rate Test of Containment 
has been being approved plant by plant). 
 
A1.3 Mexico 
 
The Mexican Nuclear Regulatory policy establish that the PSA technology should be applied 
in all regulatory activities, where practical, to complement the deterministic regulation and to 
support the defence in depth philosophy. Therefore, two regulatory guides SN-01 and SN-02 
were developed to be included, adapting the guidelines used in the USNRC RG-1.174 and 
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1.177, in the Mexican Regulatory Framework. The guides establish a methodology to assess 
the impact on safety of proposals for permanent changes to the licensing basis and also, 
changes to the technical specifications, supported only by deterministic analysis or by a 
combination of deterministic and probabilistic analysis. The methodology considers relevant 
aspects such as safety margins, defence in depth, risk criteria and monitoring performance. 
 
A procedure to link deterministic and probabilistic tools to evaluate operational events and 
inspection findings was developed looking for an integral decision making process and focus 
resources in the most relevant event and findings including the risk point of view. 
Modifications to NRC/SDP were performed to include a flow chart instead of a questionnaire 
in the first event/finding screening, and the worksheets developed as part of the procedure 
were automated in order to facilitate their application; the simplified PRA model required by 
the procedure was validated with the LVNPP IPE model. Also, a Risk Based Inspection 
Guides (RBIG) has been developed to incorporate risk information into the inspections 
activities. The RBIG have been used to prioritize inspections and to optimize resources.  
 
A1.4 Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands Regulatory Authority (NRA10) has demanded the licensees to do a full PSA 
level 1 - 3. This work was completed already in the 1990's. The licensees should conform to 
the safety goals set by the NRA. These limits are quite strict in that they postulate a more than 
linear11 decrease of probability with increasing releases.  The PSAs should be kept ‘living’. 
 
The NRA has also considered to develop and implement risk-informed regulation, departing 
from the USNRC approach (e.g. RG 1.174), but actual progress is limited. One application is 
that the licensee(s) must continuously seek to reduce risk and report back to the NRA on an 
annual basis. 
 
PSA is used to develop scenarios for emergency response exercises, including SAMG 
execution. 
 
A1.5 Romania 
 
The use of PSA is made under a special regulation ‘Requirements on Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants’, published on Official Monitor, Part I, nr. 980 from 
07/12/2006. The main principles mentioned to be followed in this norm are: 
 
1. In addition to DSA the Authorization Holder have to elaborate and use also PSA on 
design and operating stages of an NPP. All the hypothesis used in PSA on modelling 
and quantifying the accident sequences have to be as realistic as possible – Art.3; 
2. […] The PSA methodology and results have to be independently evaluated – Art.5; 
3. […] On developing PSA the exclusion of some initiating events have to be justified 
taking into consideration both the sequence of event and the consequences of these – 
Art.8 (3); 
                                                 
10
 Dutch acronym: KFD 
11
 In fact, quadratic. 
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4. PSA should be based on a realistic model of the NPP response to events, using 
relevant dates for the project and taking into consideration the human operator actions 
according to the Operating Procedures for normal operation, and as for accident 
situations. The human liability analysis has to be done taking into consideration the 
factors that may influence the human operator actions on each NPP state – Art.9; 
5. PSA have to include all the relevant connections and interactions between the NPP’s 
systems. […] – Art.10 (1); 
6. By PSA it has to be demonstrated that the NPP project is balanced […] – Art.11; 
7. […] PSA has to include uncertainty analysis and sensitivity studies. – Art.12; 
8. […] this database12 has to be continuously followed, analysed and kept up to date, and 
the PSA has to be actualized to reflect the exploitation experience. – Art.13 (2); 
9. PSA has to rely on the actualized project of the NPP. […] – Art.14. 
 
Regarding the use of PSA, it is stipulated in these norms that the utilization of PSA has to be 
considered at least on the following aspects […]: 
 
a) For the identification of factors which have impact on nuclear security, for systematic 
revision of safety margins and existent security reserves; 
b) For the revision of Limits and Conditions for Operation; 
c) For the revision of nuclear safety classification and categorization of the structures, 
systems, components and equipments of the NPP; 
d) For the implementation of a program for monitoring the risk in exploitation; 
e) For establishing and planning the inspections during the operation of the NPP, paying 
a great attention to the components that were identified as presenting a significant 
contribution to risk; 
f) For the identification of practical improvements with the purpose of reducing the risk 
associated to NPP exploitation; 
g) For evaluating of the important modifications for nuclear safety; 
h) For the analysis of the events that have occurred in the NPP and for evaluating their 
significance for the nuclear safety; 
i) For the optimization of the preventive maintenance and testing programs. – Art.22. 
 
                                                 
12
 On the DB establishing, at least the following data categories have to be taken into consideration: the 
frequency of different initiating events, the frequency and the duration needed for getting out of service the 
equipments and components important to nuclear safety, the failure rate for the equipment important to nuclear 
safety, the relevant data for the common cause failures and the data needed for the estimation of human errors 
probabilities. 
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Appendix 2: APPLICATIONS OF THE COMBINATION OF PSA AND 
DSA AT THE PRESENT TECHNICAL MEETING 
 
The following two papers in the presentation explicitly cover the combination of PSA and 
DSA. 
 
A2.1  Integration of Probabilistic Safety Assessments and Deterministic Safety Analysis  
for improvement of the human reliability analysis, A. Prosek -  M. Cepin, Slovenia 
 
Human reliability analysis is an important support and a part of probabilistic safety 
assessment. The objective of this paper is to integrate realistic deterministic safety analysis 
and probabilistic safety assessment to show how deterministic safety analysis impacts the 
human reliability analysis. The RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch 03 computer code is used for 
realistic safety analysis. Parametric safety analysis studies represent a standpoint for 
determining the time parameters for human actions, which are used within calculation of 
human error probabilities. The method is demonstrated through selected representative human 
actions. The results show that realistic safety analysis represents an important standpoint for 
assessment of human error probabilities within human reliability analysis. 
 
 
A2.2  Insights from the best estimate safe analyses for a precise PSA modelling,  
S. Han, Republic of Korea 
 
As an effort to improve the current probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model for OPR-
1000, we found several areas that needed a re-estimation of the accident sequences by using a 
best-estimated thermal hydraulic code. As one of these areas, we identified that the LOCA 
sequences should be improved in the analysis model associated with the classification of the 
LOCA groups as well as the arrangement of the safety injection water source.  
 
Firstly, we identified the classification problem of the LOCA groups in the current PSA for 
the OPR-1000, but they did not affect the result of the LOCA sequences because of the 
limitation of the current PSA approach. However, we expect that our reclassification could be 
useful if we try to apply a new approach to the estimation of the initiator frequency based on 
the mechanical characteristics, like a concept of the leak-before-break (LBB) applied to a pipe 
failure. Secondly, we estimated the effect from the chronological order between the 
recirculation operation of the safety injection system and the shutdown cooling operation. 
Especially, because it is necessary to supply small injection flow at a small break LOCA, the 
chronological order has a large effect on the core damage frequency.  
 
Although a precise estimation was not achieved in this study, we showed that the 
chronological order between the re-circulation operation of the safety injection and the 
shutdown cooling operation had a large impact on the core damage frequency in the small 
break LOCA. We concluded that the present re-estimation has the potential of a realistic 
estimation and it is necessary to improve the current PSA model using the new information. 
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APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLES OF COMBINED PROBABILISTIC AND 
DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS 
 
A3.1 ATUCHA-2 (Argentina) 
 
Probabilistic safety analysis plays a major role in nuclear installation licensing in Argentina. 
The nuclear regulatory authority of Argentina, ARN, has been established in its current 
configuration as an autonomous body by the Act 24,804, on April 25th of 1997. 
 
In accordance with the above mentioned act, ARN is entitled to “establish regulations related 
to radiation and nuclear safety, physical protection and nuclear materials use control, the 
licensing and control of nuclear facilities, international safeguards and transport of nuclear 
materials”. 
 
Extensive use of deterministic and probabilistic methods has been made at regulatory level for 
definition of boundary conditions and acceptance criteria for NPP accident analyses. While in 
most countries the backbone for accident analysis is performed by deterministic safety 
analysis (DSA) methods with probabilistic considerations to categorize the postulated 
initiating events (PIE), and the correspondent acceptance criteria , ARN prescribed in the 
regulatory standard AR 3.1.3, “Radiological criteria relating to accidents in nuclear power 
plants”, the use of probabilistic methods to perform safety analysis.  
 
Plant acceptability is derived from the overall radiological consequences for the grouped 
events (into ten groups), by entering into the left lower triangle of Figure A3.1. The 
radiological consequences, in terms of effective dose, have to be evaluated for the so called 
“critical group”. Associated probabilities to each one of the ten event groups are determined 
following typical probabilistic methods to evaluate fault trees and event trees. 
Despite the fact that the current trend in nuclear safety is moving towards a combined 
approach of both deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses methods, leading to the so-
called “risk-informed” regulation, the Argentinean  regulatory standard can be seen as an 
example of a more “risk-based” regulation.  
 
Even though that the decision making process for the licensing of Atucha 2 NPP has to 
consider the probabilistic criterion of ARN standard, the current licensing process is following 
a combination of both DSA and PSA approaches.  
Example – licensing of Atucha2 NPP in Argentina is carried out according to regulation AR 
3.1.3 but at the same time, ARN is requiring a traditional Final Safety Analysis Report with a 
well established scope for a Deterministic Safety Analysis 
 
Argentina was one of the first countries to move towards what is nowadays termed “risk-
based regulation”. As explained above, accident analysis should deploy probabilistic methods 
to determine the frequency of the event, considering also availability of safety systems to 
determine the frequency of the event. Permissible consequences are established according to 
the frequency of the event. 
 
Putting regulation AR 3.1.3 Atucha2 NPP chose to provide a PSA level 2 as “backbone” of its 
safety case. However, since the regulation AR 3.1.3 requires fulfilling acceptance criteria 
based on dose and not on releases, dispersion calculations have to be made. Atucha2 decided 
to roughly follow relevant USNRC regulatory guides to evaluate the dose rate to the critical 
group. 
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Figure A3.1, Permissible effective dose to a “critical group”, depending on the probability of 
the group of postulated events (from regulatory standard AR 3.1.3, “Radiological criteria 
relating to accidents in nuclear power plants”). 
 
 
A3.2 Borssele (NL) 
 
The single nuclear power plant in the Netherlands is Borssele (KCB, 480 MWe, started 
commercial operation 1973) has been active in PSA for many years. 
 
PSA helped to execute and optimise the big modernisation effort of the years 1990 - 1997, 
when the plant, built to rules and regulations of the 1970s, was brought in line with the actual 
regulations. E.g., systems were refurbished to include appropriate redundancy on the system 
level, and to include better spatial separation of safety systems. Main coolant lines were 
upgraded for ‘break preclusion’, which reduced the break probability. Lines that could not be 
qualified were equipped with pipe whip restraint (secondary system lines outside containment 
only). Improvements included also emergency power and ultimate heat sinks during external 
events. Seismic resistance was also investigated. A fire risk PSA was also executed. 
 
At present, applications of the PSA include on-line inspection / maintenance / testing (i.e. 
during power operation). It also includes a risk monitor, which is helpful for shutdown 
planning. PSA has been used to develop and implement SAMG and is used for SAMG drills / 
exercises. 
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A3.3 New Reactor Designs 
 
This section on new reactor designs was provided by the Chairman of the meeting, Mr George 
Vayssier, based on his experience with the review of these designs. All information provided 
in this section is in the public domain. 
 
A3.3.1 AP 1000 
 
# Topic         DiD Ref. in 
AP1000 
SAR 
1 ROAAM applied, combines probabilities of loads to arrive at a final load 
probability distribution for a given fission product boundary, from which 
the failure probability of the boundary is calculated. Methodology is used 
to assess mitigative techniques. If a low prob. failure of the FP boundary 
is obtained, the strategy is then considered as a successful strategy.13 
4 19.39.2 
2 Cavity flooding is done before the SAMGs are entered (at the end of 
AFR.C1)14 
4 19.39.9 
3 Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) for seismic loads ~ 1,67 SSE15; 
     
identifies SSC important to seismic risk 
plant survives 0,5 g 
4 19.55. 
19.59.6.3 
4 PRA techniques have been used since the beginning in an iterative 
process to optimize the AP600/AP1000 with respect to public safety. 
Each of these iterations has included: 
• Development of a PRA model 
• Use of the model to identify weaknesses 
• Quantification of PRA benefits of alternate designs and 
operational strategies 
• Adoption of selected design and operational improvements. 
 
All 19.59.2 
                                                 
13
 Risk Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology. Simplified interpretation; refer to work by Prof. 
Theofanous for proper interpretation. 
14
 This is the equivalent of the FR.C1-procedure of  ‘classic’ Westinghouse plants, which is an ultimate 
cooling procedure in the EOPs. 
15
 SSE = safe shutdown earthquake 
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# Topic         DiD Ref. in 
AP1000 
SAR 
5 Use of PSA in design process, see list of items in this section, 
CDF ~ 2.4E-07, LERF ~ 1.95E-08 
•  high level of redundancy and diversity in passive systems 
•  less dependent on non-safety systems 
•  non-safety support systems have limited role in plant safety 
•  less dependent on human actions, meets NRC safety goals even 
w/o human actions 
•  more robust success criteria than current PSAs 
•  no RCP seal leakage to be assumed due to canned RCPs 
•  fully automatic depressurisation systems (but spurious actuation 
is large CDF contributor, sec. 19.59.3.1). Note: this systems 
replaces manual feed and bleed 
•  LOOP less relevant due to passive systems 
•  no RPV penetrations 
•  no ex-vessel corium due to RPV external cooling, no MCCI 
•  fully passive containment cooling, hence no risk for overpressure 
•  low probability for spreading of fires and internal floods 
•  automatic switch from injection to recirculation 
•  various benefits during shutdown mode 
•  fire protection devices 
1-4 19.59.1 
19.59.3. 
19.59.5.3 
19.59.6.2 
6 Redefinition of break sizes (LBLOCA, MBLOCA, SBLOCA 
LBLOCA is >9 inch, incl. RPV rupture 
9 < MBLOCA < 2 inch 
2 < SBLOCA < 3/8 inch 
3/8 < reactor leaks < 0 inch 
3 19.59.3 
7 Common cause failures from PSA: 
• software in the protection and safety monitoring system and plant 
control system,  
• logic board failures of the protection and safety monitoring 
system;  
• failures of transmitters used in the protection and safety 
monitoring system;  
• failures of reactor trip breakers;  
• plugging of containment sump recirculation screens;  
• failures of in-containment refuelling water storage tank 
• gravity injection line check valves and squib valves;  
• plugging of strainers in the in-containment refuelling water 
storage tank;  
• failures of fourth-stage automatic depressurization system squib 
• valves, and  
• failures of output cards for the protection and safety monitoring 
system. 
 
1-4 19.59.3.5 
8 HRA: 
10 actions with importance > 1% 
no action results in decrease of CDF > 3% if assumed successful 
only 7 actions have importance 100 % (-> core damage) 
perfection of human actions not relevant for risk (most important: actions 
on SGTR) 
3, 4 19.59.3.6 
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# Topic         DiD Ref. in 
AP1000 
SAR 
9 Check valve reliability is not relevant for risk 3,4 19.59.3.8 
10 Overview of all PSA insights for AP1000 all Table 
19.59.18 (24 
pages) 
11 Consideration of Severe Accidents Mitigation Design Alternatives 
(SAMDA’s) 
4  
 
 
 
A3.3.2 EPR 
 
 # Topic Reference SAR 
 1 By use of Probabilistic Safety Analyses (PSA) at the concept design 
phase to confirm the design approach and identify the multiple 
failure sequences that should be considered in the design basis, so as 
to prevent core meltdown accidents. Within this framework, an 
overall core meltdown frequency of 10-5 per annum per unit is set 
as a design objective, taking into account all types of failures and 
hazards.  
Vol. II, subchapter 
C.1 
 2 The purpose of using probabilistic assessment is to give reasonable 
confidence that the design complies with the general safety 
objectives. To reach this overall safety level, probabilistic 
considerations are used:  
• to give assistance to plant designers for system comparison 
and optimisation,  
• to extend the deterministic design basis (RRC-A sequences) 
in order to achieve a balanced design, ensuring that there 
are no ‘cliff edge’ effects and to reduce risks to an 
acceptable level considering preventive and mitigation 
measures,  
• to justify the preventive maintenance schedule,  
• to verify the analysis of severe accidents,  
• to confirm the appropriateness of protection of the plant 
against certain internal and external hazards,  
• to assess the improvement in the safety level in comparison 
with existing reactors.  
• includes fire PSA (subchapter R.4) 
Vol II, subchapter 
R.0, R.4 
 
 
A3.3.3. ESBWR 
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• Identify and address potential design and operational 
vulnerabilities. 
• Reduce or eliminate known weaknesses of existing operating 
plants that are applicable to the new design, by introducing 
appropriate features and requires. 
• Identify risk-informed safety insights based on systematic 
evaluations of the risks associated with the design. 
• Develop an in-depth understanding of the design’s robustness 
and tolerance of severe accidents initiated by either internal or 
external events. 
• Develop an appreciation of the risk-significance of specific 
human errors associated with the design, and characterize the 
significant human errors in preparation for better training and 
more refined procedures. 
•  Identify and support the development of design requirements, 
such as inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria 
(ITAACs), reliability assurance program (RAP), technical 
specifications (TS), and COL action items and interface 
requirements. 
• Support the process used to determine whether regulatory 
treatment of non-safety systems (RTNSS) is necessary, if 
applicable. 
• Determine whether the plant design, including the impact of site-
specific characteristics, represents a reduction in risk compared 
to existing operating plant designs 
Ch. 19, Part 1 
 
 
 
A3.3.4. ACR 1000 
 
The PSA will also be used to provide safety design assistance through engineering feedback 
to the process designers at an early stage so that changes can be made before construction. 
Ref. PSA-1 submission to UK HSE, sec. 1.4.1 
 
 
A3.4 Laguna Verde NPP 
 
The following is a deterministic + probabilistic change to the Technical Operation 
Specifications (TOS) of Laguna Verde that Mexican Regulatory Commission made to test the 
methodology to evaluate TOS changes.  
 
The change was requested for the TOS 3/4.3.2 "Instrumentation Performance for Isolation”. 
The government utility CFE proposes a change in the allowed time out of service (ATO) from 
one hour to seven days, of the differential temperature channels (∆T) of the insulation 
instrumentation. This arguing that events in which ∆T failure is caused by the unavailability 
of the ventilation system of the reactor building “Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning” 
(HVAC), the time allowed out of 1 hour is insufficient for the recovery of HVAC and at the 
same time causes the insulation systems Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC),  Reactor 
Water Clean-Up (RWCU) and also the Reactor Heat Removal (RHR), by action of the TOS 
by not restoring the availability of the instrument within the time allowed for 1 hour.  
 
During the evaluation both aspects were analyzed deterministic and also performed a 
calculation of the increased risk. The plant operational experience indicates that the ATO of 
1hr, has been insufficient to maintain the HVAC and leads to entry into the action of TOS 
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3/4.3.2, which has been identified that results in a sharp increase in risk, given the isolation of 
the systems RCIC / RWCU / RHR. 
 
For its part, the change request proposes a change in the ATO of 1hr to 7days, which meets 
the proficiency required to provide timely maintenance to HVAC and meets the criteria for 
acceptance of increased risk of Guide. In addition, it also proposes new controls on the 
HVAC, which is expected result in better performance of it and in a decreased rate of entry to 
the TOS action at issue. 
 
Therefore, based on a comprehensive making decisions ruled that the change would be 
acceptable in the ATO from 1 hour to 7 days, as long as they replace the action of the TOS 
indicating to put the unit in shutdown. This would meet the maintenance requirements, better 
control and performance of the HVAC plant and carry a lower risk settings without having to 
go first to a higher risk, in cases where HVAC return is not reached and therefore the ∆T, as 
exhaustion of the new off-duty time allowed. It should also be included as part of the change 
compensatory measures that have emerged from internal operational experience to ensure 
temperature control in the precincts affected by the unavailability of HVAC. 
 
Nevertheless, this example was not put in practice in the LVNPP because several people from 
the Nuclear Safety Division request a complete change of the HVAC system instead of 
modification in TOS.  
 
A3.5 Cernavoda NPP 
 
i) Outage interval extension: was done based on the fact that the results of PSA identified 
large safety margins coming from the deterministic analysis and the sensitivity case 
performed on the PSA model concluded that the risk increase is not unacceptably high. In 
order to comply also with the deterministic analysis and with the requirements on special 
safety systems reliability, some of the preventive maintenance and tests where moved from 
the outage to on-line operation. The result was that the outage, previously approx. 27 days 
each year, at the present is approx. 44 days each two years. 
Outage planning: it is done base on the design documentation and the designer specifications 
and the plan is then verified with EOOS risk monitor to obtain the risk profile and to 
demonstrate that the risk will not exceed the acceptable limits. If the risk profile shows areas 
of unacceptable risk the outage plane is modified by rearranging the maintenance and testing 
activities in a way that maintains the risk at acceptable level in all plant configurations.  
 
ii) Plant safety related modifications: in each case when the plant applies for approval of a 
modification on a safety significant system the application shall contain the deterministic and 
probabilistic evaluation of the impact it produces on the plant safety.  
 
iii) Temporary changes of plant configuration: temporary deviation of plant configurations 
from provisions in OLC has been accepted provided that the operational risk of the plant did 
not exceed the acceptable limits. 
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Abstract 
This publication presents the main results of the Technical Meeting on Application of Advanced Safety Methods 
(for licensing of Nuclear Power Plants) held on 7-11 June 2010 in Bled, Slovenia. It was organized with the 
cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development - Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA). 
This meeting is part of a series organized by the three organizations and has the objective to provide a forum to 
exchange information regarding activity in the use of Advanced Safety Methods more specifically focussiong on 
deterministic Best Estimate plus Uncertainty (BEPU) methods both in the domains of research and relative to 
licensing and on Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
The use of BEPU methods is possible today due to the increased knowledge in Thermal-hydraulic phenomena 
and high performance computational tools and allows a much clearer understanding of the available safety 
margin during Design Base Accidents. The results shows that the industry is in fact moving in this direction in 
order to be able to demonstrate compliance to safety limits after power uprates as the older conservative 
methods were shown to be too pessimistic. 
The use of probabilistic and deterministic methods is today starting to be used for defence in depth concept and 
also more often in combination with Deterministic Safety Analysis. 
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